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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900172-CA 
v* : 
RICHARD LEE CRAWFORD, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for a new 
trial. Defendant was convicted of theft and burglary of a 
dwelling, both second degree felonies, after a trial in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court properly deny defendant's 
motion for a new trial based upon defendant's claim that the 
prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence? The decision to grant 
or deny a motion for a new trial is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a 
clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 
223 (Utah 1985). 
2. Did the lower court properly deny defendant's 
motion for a new trial based upon defendant's claim that the 
prosecutor failed to call a particular witness? (The same 
standard as cited above is applicable.) 
3. Did the lower court properly deny defendant's 
motion for new trial based upon defendant's claim that the 
prosecutor mentioned evidence in his opening statement that was 
not admitted into evidence during trial? (Same standard.) 
4. Did the lower court properly deny defendant's 
motion for a new trial based upon defendant's claim that a 
state's witness was intoxicated at trial? (Same standard.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The relevant provisions relied upon by the State are 
set forth in the argument section of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary of a dwelling, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1978), and theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) (R. 3-4). He was convicted on both 
counts after a jury trial held December 7 and 8, 1988, in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ray M. Harding, 
Judge, presiding (R. 146-47, T. 1). Judge Harding sentenced 
defendant on January 10, 1989, to serve two concurrent terms of 
one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison (R. 155-59). 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on January 4, 
1989 (R. 151-53). Judge Harding denied defendant's motion on 
April 24, 1989 in a Memorandum Decision (R. 185-86) (See 
The record on appeal has been designated "R.", the trial 
transcript has been designated "T.M, and the preliminary hearing 
transcript has been designated "P.". 
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Appendices "A", Memorandum Decision; and "B", Order). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 25, 1988, six rooms at the Paradise Inn in 
Fillmore, Utah, were burglarized (T. 58, 60, 66). The burglar 
stole a television set, remote control and a bedspread from each 
room (T. 67, 87). The bedspreads were rust in color, made of a 
unique design, and had been bought from a motel supply company 
that does not sell its wares to the general public (T. 65, 74, 
80, 81). Sergeant John Kimball of the Millard County Sheriff's 
Office found evidence of forced entry on the motel room doors and 
subsequently recovered two stolen bedspreads, one from Steve 
Johnson and the other from Margarite Byrge (T. 125, 126, 129). 
At trial, Deputy James Masner of the Millard County 
Sheriff's Office was qualified as a fingerprint expert and 
positively identified defendant's latent fingerprint found on a 
television mounting bracket in one of the burglarized motel rooms 
(T. 168-69, 166, 174-75). Richard Wright, a latent fingerprint 
examiner at the State of Utah Crime Lab, concurred with Masner's 
opinion (T. 237-41). Masner also testified that a footprint 
taken at the motel matched the tred from defendant's shoe (T. 
181-82, 190-92). 
During trial, defendant objected to the admission of 
several screwdrivers and a pry bar on the basis that they were 
illegally seized from defendant's vehicle (T. 221). The 
prosecutor had previously mentioned these items in his opening 
statement along with the fact that a large screwdriver or a pry 
bar had apparently been used to break into the motel rooms (T. 
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53-54 )• The record is unclear whether the lower court suppressed 
these items, or whether the prosecutor simply agreed not to offer 
them into evidence (T. 233-35). In either event, the items were 
not offered or further mentioned. 
Testifying on his own behalf, defendant denied that he 
gave Byrge the bedspread (T. 254). He also claimed that he did 
not buy the shoes Masner matched with the footprints at the crime 
scene until the day after the motel burglary (T. 258). Finally, 
he denied that he had been to the Paradise Inn in Fillmore, Utah 
(T. 262-63). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to grant defendant's motion for a new trial based on 
defendant's claim that the State withheld exculpatory information 
in the form of a witness. The trial court found that the 
testimony at the preliminary hearing fully apprised defendant of 
the witness's name and general testimony. Additionally, 
defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of the testimony 
since it did nothing to undermine the overwhelming evidence of 
defendant's guilt. 
The lower court also did not abuse his discretion in 
denying a new trial on the basis that the State failed to call 
the alleged exculpatory witness. The State has no obligation to 
call witnesses on defendant's behalf. Had defendant desired this 
witness's testimony, he could have subpoenaed the witness 
himself. 
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
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defendant's motion for new trial based on defendant's claim that 
the prosecutor improperly mentioned evidence in his opening 
statement which was not offered during trial. Defendant did not 
object to the opening statement at trial. Additionally, the 
prosecutor in good faith referred to evidence which was 
subsequently not offered due to defendant's belated suppression 
motion raised in the midst of trial. In any event, the 
prosecutor's comments did not prejudice the trial's outcome. 
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
a new trial on defendant's claim that a State's witness was 
intoxicated at trial. Intoxication by itself does not make a 
witness incompetent to testify, but instead goes to the witness's 
credibility. Defendant had an opportunity to explore this 
witness's alleged intoxication, but chose not to do so. The 




DEFENDANT HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ALLEGED 
UNDISCLOSED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
Defendant argues that the State withheld exculpatory 
evidence consisting of Steven Johnson's statement that defendant 
had given him the bedspread over a year before the motel 
burglary. (See Brief of Appellant at 6-7). He concludes that 
the lower court abused its discretion in denying his motion for 
new trial based on this ground. Defendant's claim must fail. 
Defendant had actual notice of Steven Johnson's 
statement. Judge Harding specifically found "that even though 
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Mr, Johnson was not present at the Preliminary Hearing, the 
Defendant received all the information which he was entitled to 
concerning the possible testimony of Mr. Johnson and the second 
bedspread." (R. 232-33) (See Appendix "B"; Order). The lower 
court's finding was based upon the preliminary hearing testimony 
of Deputy John Kimball who indicated that Johnson told him that 
he obtained the bedspread from defendant approximately January 1, 
1987 (P. 16). Accordingly, the lower court found that defendant 
"had ample opportunity to call Mr. Johnson and examine him 
concerning the bedspread, had the Defendant wanted to issue a 
subpoena. (R. 232-33) (See Appendix "B"; Order). 
Additionally, defendant's preliminary hearing included 
three separate informations charging defendant with burglary and 
theft of the Paradise Inn on three separate occasions; January 
12, 1987, December 7, 1987 and February 25, 1988 (P.3, 73-75). 
Defendant was bound over on all charges, but was tried separately 
on the February 25, 1988 burglary (Id.). Thus, the testimony of 
Steve Johnson was not exculpatory for defendant, but was simply 
relevant to the previous burglary. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT CANNOT COMPLAIN THAT THE STATE DID 
NOT CALL A WITNESS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN 
CALLED BY THE DEFENSE. 
Defendant next claims that the State shpuld have called 
Steve Johnson as a witness so that defendant could have cross-
examined him. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
While defendant cites numerous cases on the importance 
of cross-examination, he fails to cite a single case that 
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requires the prosecution to call witnesses on defendant's behalf. 
On the other hand, the Idaho Court of Appeals has specifically 
held that the prosecution's failure to call a witness does not 
implicate a defendant's confrontation rights. State v. Sena, 106 
Idaho 25, 674 P.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1983). Indeed, the weight 
of authority suggests that the prosecution has no duty to call 
witnesses for the defense. As the Mississippi Supreme Court 
bluntly stated, "Neither the appellant, nor the court, instructs 
the State, or any other party to litigation, what witnesses that 
party shall put on the stand or how that party shall present its 
case." Hickson v. State, 512 So.2d 1, 3 (Miss. 1987). See also 
Beverly v. State, 543 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ind. 1989). But see 
State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn.), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 
29 (1990) (state should call child witness whose hearsay 
statements are being used as evidence against defendant). 
In the instant case, the lower court found "that the 
State can call and use whatever witnesses it feels are necessary, 
and is under no obligation to call witnesses for the defense. 
Had the defendant wanted Mr. Johnson's testimony, he could have 
issued a subpoena." (R. 185-86) (See Appendix "A"; Memorandum 
Decision). Having knowledge of Johnson's potential testimony, 
defendant chose neither to subpoena Johnson nor call him as a 
witness. Defendant cannot now complain that the State failed to 
call him as a witness. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
THAT THE PROSECUTOR REFERRED IN HIS OPENING 
STATEMENT TO EVIDENCE NOT INTRODUCED AT TRIAL 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor made improper 
reference in his opening statement to burglar tools which were 
not introduced at trial. Once again, defendant's claim must 
fail. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of 
an opening statement is to apprise the jury of what counsel 
intends to prove by providing an overview of the facts counsel 
intends to prove. State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 
1982); See also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 
1988), on reconsideration, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989) (continued 
vitality of Williams). In reviewing an opening statement on 
appeal, the test is whether the statements, viewed against the 
entire argument, deprived defendant of a fair trial. United 
States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1435 (2d Cir.), cert, denied 
sub, nom., Shipp v. United States, 472 U.S. 1019 (1985). The 
Missouri Court of Appeals has held that "[w]hen the prosecutor 
has reasonable grounds to believe that the facts stated can be 
proved, the statement is not improper." State v. Drinkard, 750 
S.W.2d 630, 636 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). See Commonwealth v. 
Lamrini, 392 Mass. 427, 467 N.E.2d 95, 99 n.4 (1984); State v. 
Freeman, 539 So.2d 739, 744 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 543 
So.2d 17 (La. 1989); State v. Maillian, 464 So.2d 1071, 1075 (La. 
Ct. App.), writ denied, 469 So. 2d 982 (La. 1985). 
As part of his opening statement, the prosecutor 
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informed the jury that he intended to introduce several 
screwdrivers and a pry bar which the jury could compare with the 
marks on the doorjams of the motel rooms (T. 53-54). However, 
during trial, defendant objected to the tools, arguing they had 
been illegally seized (T. 221). Both the prosecutor and defense 
counsel discussed the propriety of the seizure with Judge Harding 
(T. 222-26, 232-36). The tools ultimately were not admitted, 
although it is unclear whether they were suppressed by the judge, 
or whether the prosecutor simply agreed not to offer them (T. 
233-35). 
The record is clear that the prosecutor acted in good 
faith. He fully expected to introduce the tools into evidence. 
He could not foresee defendant's objection since he considered 
the tools to be legally seized in plain view under a search 
warrant on defendant's vehicle (T. 233). Additionally, defendant 
had not sought a pretrial suppression ruling as required by Rule 
12(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Since the prosecutor's 
remarks were not prejudicial to the outcome and he did not act in 
bad faith, defendant's claim of error must fail. See United 
States v. Obreqon, 893 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 110 
S. Ct. 1833 (1990); United States v. Tolman, 826 F.2d 971, 973 
(10th Cir. 1987) . 
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POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
THAT A STATE'S WITNESS WAS INTOXICATED AT 
TRIAL. 
Defendant claims that Margarite Byrge testified while 
intoxicated and that her alleged intoxication denied him a fair 
trial. Once again, defendant's position lacks merit. 
Rule 601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that 
M[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise 
provided in these rules." Id. The Utah Supreme Court has 
previously held that the fact that witness is a drug addict goes 
not to competency, but to the witness's credibility. State v. 
Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah 1977) The West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals recently held that an intoxicated 
witness will be excluded only if he does not know what he is 
testifying to. State v. Porter, 392 S.E.2d 216, 223 (W. Va. 
1990). Otherwise, a witness's intoxication goes to credibility. 
Id. See United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 127 (1989) (applying Rule 601, Federal 
Rules of Evidence). See also State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 
661 P.2d 1105, 1121, cert, denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); Mirin v. 
State, 93 Nev. 57, 560 P.2d 145, 145 (1977); State v. Hall, 464 
So.2d 966, 969 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
The crux of defendant's argument is that the jury 
should have been informed of Byrge's alleged intoxication. To 
support his claim that Byrge was intoxicated, defendant presented 
in support of his motion for new trial an affidavit from his 
investigator stating the investigator detected the odor of 
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alcohol on Byrge's breath immediately after she had testified (R. 
177-78). However, defendant chose to release Byrge as a witness 
the next day, rather than call her to the stand (T. 236). If 
defendant wanted to question Byrge about her alleged 
intoxication, he had every opportunity to do so. His failure to 
timely raise the issue or request a cautionary jury instruction 
constitutes waiver. See State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 
(Utah 1982) . 
Additionally, Judge Harding stated in his Memorandum 
Decision: 
Defense alleges that Margarite Burge 
[sic] might have been impaired by drugs or 
alcohol and was therefor an unreliable 
witness. The Court is not aware of any 
evidence that Ms. Burge [sic] was impaired at 
the time she testified. The only evidence is 
that she had alcohol on her breath after the 
trial. During trial the Court did not detect 
any evidence that she was impaired in any 
way. The testimony presented at trial was 
more helpful to the defendant than damaging. 
(R. 186) (See Appendix A). Judge Harding was in a position to 
observe Byrge's demeanor and the responsiveness of her answers. 
He clearly determined that Byrge was not impaired. See United 
States v. Bevens# 728 F. Supp. 340, 346-47 (E.D. Pa. 1990), 
aff'd, 914 F.2d 244 (3rd Cir. 1990). He also concluded that 
because Byrge's testimony was more favorable to defendant than 
damaging, defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to inquire 
into Byrge's sobriety at trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
DATED this / /"*— day of November, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
K <~~ rfffr^sz 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage pre-paid to 
Milton T. Harmon, attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 97, Nephi, UT 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER 1090 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
RICHARD LEE CRAWFORD, 
Defendant. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court, having considered defendant's motion for a 
new trial, will again deny that motion. The Court will also deny 
defendant's special motion for discovery. 
Defendant has made a number of claims of error in his 
motion for a new trial, which the Court considered in it's 
earlier motion denying a new trial. At the present time, the 
only claim of error which appears to have merit is that the State 
withheld evidence concerning the testimony of Steve Johnson. 
Defendant claims that the State did not disclose information 
concerning the date Steve Johnson might have obtained a bedspread 
from the defendant and which could have been exculpatory. After 
consideration of the memoranda and affidavits which have been 
submitted, the Court finds that the defendant received all of the 
information which they were entitled to concerning the possible 
testimony of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson was present and testified 
at the preliminary hearing. The defendant had ample opportunity 
to call Mr. Johnson and examine him concerning the bedspread. 
Defendant also claims that Mr. Johnson was sent home 
from the trial by the State and could not testify. The Court 
finds that the State can call and use whatever witnesses it feels 
1 Q001SJ 
are necessary, and is under no obligation to call witnesses for 
the defense. Had the defendant wanted Mr. Johnson's testimony, 
he could have issued a subpoena. 
Defendant alleges that Margarite Burge might have been 
impaired by drugs or alcohol and was therefor an unreliable 
witness. The Court is not aware of any evidence that Ms. Burge 
was impaired at the time she testified. The only evidence is 
that she had alcohol on her breath after the trial. During trial 
the Court did not detect any evidence that she was impaired in 
any way. The testimony presented by Ms. Burge at trial was more 
helpful to the defendant than damaging. 
After careful consideration of all of the claim of 
error made by the defendant, the Court finds that the defendant 
has not shown that there was error, and that the error might have 
made a difference in the outcome of the trial. State v. Eaton, 
569 P.2d 1114 (1977). The Court finds that the critical piece of 
evidence in this case was the fingerprint placing the defendant 
at the scene of the crime and in contact with the stolen 
property. 
Regarding the discovery issues, the Court finds that 
the State disclosed all information which it was required to 
disclose. The special motion for discovery is therefore denied. 
Dated this 24th day of April, 1989. 
Milton T. Harmon. Esq. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD LEE CRAWFORD 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
SPECIAL DISCOVERY 
Case No. 88-1219 
The Court having entered its Memorandum Decision herein 
dated April 24, 1989; and having thereafter considered 
Defendants Counsels' letter concerning an error in the 
prosecution1s memorandum reciting that Steve Johnson 
testified personally at the Preliminary Hearing, when in fact 
he did not, the Court hereby finds as follows: 
1. Defendant's Counsel and Defendant were made aware of 
the witness, Steve Johnson, and the bedspread in possession 
of the Millard County Sheriff's Office retreived from Steve 
Johnson, through the testimony of Officer John Kimball, who 
did testify at the Preliminary Hearing. (See Defendant's 
Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing 
A New Trial dated March 31, 1989.) 
2. The Court further finds that even though Mr. Johnson 
was not present at the Preliminary Hearing, the Defendant 
received all the information which he was entitled to concern-
ing the possible testimony of Mr. Johnson and the second 
bedspread. The Defendant had ample opportunity to call 
Mr. Johnson and examine him concerning the bedspread, had 
the Defendant wanted to issue a subpoena. 
3. After careful consideration of all of the claims of 
error made by the Defendantf the Court finds that the 
Defendant has not shown that there was error, and that the 
error might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. 
THEREFORE/ IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for 
a New Trial is overruled and denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, consistant with this Court's 
Memorandum Decision/ dated April 24/ 2989/ that Defendant's 
Special Motion for Discovery is also oj&e«?uled and denied. 
DATED this 2Z5T 
day^df H < ^ / , 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial and 
Special Discovery to Attorneys for Defendant: ^a^Ui^L^-, tWf 
LeRay G. Jackson Milton T. Harmon 
297 North Highway 6, 545 36 South Main Street 
Delta, Utah 84624 Nephi, Utah 84648 
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